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Abstract 
Many companies would prefer employees to follmv information security practices 
naturally rather than by management directives and enforcement. The paper reports 
some of the main findings from a large interpretive research project involving a 
literature review, three case studi~s and two focus groups conducted in Australia. 
Findings include a framework for fostering information security culture in Australian 
SMEs and a discussion of key issues. The paper highlights the criticality of both the 
SME owner role and the national context in fostering information security culture in 
SMEs. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. 
Keywords 
Information security culture, small and medium-size enterprises. 
1. Introduction 
One of the most important areas for information security management is employee 
misuse and abuse of information assets, also known as the "insider threat" (Furnell et 
aI., 2000). According to recent reports, employee misuse and abuse of internet 
services comprise 20 - 50 per cent of internet incidents (AusCERT, 2006; CSIIFBI, 
2006). Whether employees are inclined to behave securely in their use of company 
information systems can be vie\ved socio-culturally. The socio-technical perspective 
may best reflect employee behaviour with information security techllologies. This 
new approach to managing the insider threat is the institutionalisation of information 
security practices as an information security culture. The potential effectiveness of 
adopting a socio-cultural approach is highlighted by recent findings from Galletta 
and Polak (2003) that peer and supervisory culture may strongly influence internal 
internet abuse. 
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However currently there is very little guidance available for small and medium size 
enterprises (SMEs) in the development of an information security culture and the 
issues to be faced along the way. SMEs typically have different managerial concerns 
to large enterprises - for example, they may possess fewer resources and may lack 
internal information technology expertise. In addition, existing conceptual 
frameworks for the development of information security culture are mainly aimed at 
large organisations. Often, such frameworks centre only on managerial directives 
such as policies and procedures to perform the task of enculturation. New conceptual 
frameworl(s are needed that integrate the complexities of behaviour modifIcation and 
cultural change with managerial directives, and that accommodate the special 
characteristics of SMEs operating in a unique national context such as Australia - the 
context for this research. Such frameworks should be based not only on existing 
theory but on the real world experiences of SMEs and the IT professionals who 
provide them with services. 
This paper reports some of the main findings from a recent research project that 
explored this topic. The project involved a literature review, three case studies and 
two focus groups. Early results from the project were reported in Dojkovski et aI., 
(2005, 20J6). This paper provides the final framework, and presents a discussion of 
key issues of interest arising from the study. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Following this section, the paper 
provides a theoretical background for the research. It then overviews the research 
design for the study. A section then provides a conceptual framework for developing 
and maintaining information security culture in SMEs, developed from the study. 
Next, key findings are discussed, and finally, conclusions are drawn. 
2. Theoretical Review 
This section synthesises representative contemporary literature on information 
security culture and reviews the unique challenges of SMEs concerning information 
security culture. 
2.1 Information Security Culture 
As mentioned earlier, recent research aims to better manage the insider threat by 
developing an information security culture (OEeD, 2002). Experts have previously 
proposed conceptual frameworks for information security management that include 
information security cultural development based on management initiatives of 
policy, awareness, training, and education (for example Lichtenstein and Swatman, 
2001). However, such frameworks may be better suited to medium and large size 
organisations due to their significant infrastructure, stability and resources 
requirements. In recent years, dedicated frameworks for information security culture 
have been developed, as reviewed below. 
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Several frameworks have focused on organisational culture and the measurement of 
information security culture. ScJllienger & Teufel (2000; 2003) describe a fl:amework 
concentrating on a socio-cultural approach that is based on trust and partnership, 
accompanied by appropriate security technologies and employee security awareness. 
To address weaknesses in information security, Siponen (2000) constructs a 
conceptual foundation for organisational security awareness based on prescriptive 
persuasion based on behavioG.ral principles. The model consists of rnotivation 
principles, theory of planned behaviour and a technological acceptance model. 
Also addressing awareness, Von Solms discussed the stages of information security 
awareness maturity (von SOblS, 2000) culminating in an institutional stage, which 
involves cultivating an information security culture through standardisation, 
certification and paying attention to the human aspect of information security. An 
emphasis is placed on the continuous measurement of information security for proper 
management. 
In another framework, Chi a and colleagues (2002) arglJe that an information security 
culture has not yet been cleE'xly defined. They identified the following important 
dimensions for measuring the effectiveness of information security culture: a belief 
in the importance of information security; balancing of long- and short term goals, 
policies, procedures and processes: continuous improvement: cooperation and 
collaboration; attention to objectives; and audit compliance. However. this list was 
recently criticised by Helokunnas and Kuusisto (2003) for de-emphasising the human 
aspects of information security. 
A structured framework for j~)r:()[mation security culture \vas developed by Martins 
and Eloff (2002). Their frame\\ork is comprised of individuaL group and 
organisational levels of information security enculmration. Issues that promote 
adequate information security cultu:-e were identified in each group. The effect of 
change agents on these issue~; \':ill transform the orgamsatiorlal culture to an efIective 
information security culture. 
Helokunnas & Iivonen (2003) provide a framework based on shared values. The 
research looked at the values that a group of Finnish SMEs in the Tampere Region 
held in relation to security and developed a security framework based upon their 
beliefs and values. 
Van Niekerk and von Solms (W03) examine the role that education plays in the 
establishment of information sf:':;urity culture. Their appwach centre~; on the concept 
of an outcomes-based educatiorl i()rming the basis of cultural change, a'1d they show 
how such an approach can playa positive role in creating a culture of irformation 
security. 
A conceptual checklist of information security culture consisting of a compilation of 
information security and org2n isation culture concepts was proposed by Zakaria and 
Gani (2003). The model com j~;~" of three levels with :mal)/1jcal dimensions such as 
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surface manifestations (arte£1cts, ceremonial, course, hero, language, motto, myth, 
norm, physical layout rite, ritual, slogan, story and sYIYlbol), values (confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, authentication non-repudiation and legitimate use of 
information) and basic assumptions (mission and strategy, goals, means, 
measurement and remedial strategies) relevant to information security identified for 
each leveL 
A socio-technical perspective was proposed by (Stanton et aI., 2004). In their 
framework they focus on the human actions that inf1uence the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information systems. They suggest that security-oriented 
end-user behaviours are derived from a combination of relevant situational and 
personal factors and improving information security culture is done by examining the 
motivational antecedents of employees, such as situational and personal factors 
combined with a variety of interventions. 
A framework based on informal methods was proposed by Vroom and von Solms, 
(2004) whereby the behaviour and culture of an organisation at all levels is examined 
in an informal fashion. They suggest that studying organisational behaviour and how 
employees are influenced would prove useful in improving the security culture of an 
organisation. They suggest behaviour be separated into three groups of: the 
individuaL the group and the formal organisation. Each level needs to be examined 
simultaneously with hmv it impacts the culture of the organisation. 
A framework based on personnel capabilities was proposed by Furnell and Clarke 
(2005) who suggest security awareness, training and education as important elements 
in establishing an information security culture. Management addressing the security 
risks and what awareness, training and education could do to combat these risks. 
They also suggest that a 'one size fits all' approach will not work, and that a 
company must determine which approaches will work in a given context. 
While the above frameworks are clearly valuable, they portray a fragmented 
theoretical field and lack integration across the different areas of focus. Further, they 
do not address the unique challenges faced by SMEs operating in a national context. 
2.2 Information Security Culture and SMEs 
SMEs sufTer special disadvantages compared with large organisations in pursuing an 
information security culture. First, SMEs generally possess a weak understanding of 
information security, security technologies and control measures (Dimopoulos et aI., 
2004). Second, they lack the funds, time and specialised knowledge needed to 
coordinate information security or offer effective information security awareness, 
training and education (Furnell et aI., 2000; Dimopoulos et aI., 2004). Third, SMEs 
are unlikely to have yet reached the stage of policy, procedure and responsibility 
definition (Helokunnas & Iivonen, 2003) let alone addressed the cultural issues. 
Fourth, they are susceptible to peculiar national influences such as the collapse of 
Australian information security coordination programs for businesses arising from 
the recent demise of the National Organisation for the Information Economy (NOIE) 
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(Warren, 2003). Fifth, recent stLldies highlight various SME concerns regarding the 
difficulties of developing an information security culture (Taylor & Murphy" 2004). 
3. Research Design 
This section overviews the cenduct of the research study, which was an interpretivist 
study. A literature review \\iT'; tirst conducted and an initial conceptual framework 
for fostering information seCUl ilY culture in Australian Sl\;L;~s developed as a result 
(Dojkovski et aI., 2005). 11K" review also helped 10 develop questions for an 
exploratory focus group ("Fr,CJJS group 1 ") held ;:'1 November 2005 'vith four 
participants (representatives of S]V{E IT service providers i~1 the Geelong region of 
Australia). A focus group transcript analysis resulted in a revised conceptual model 
(Dojkovski et a1. 2006). 
Next, three in-depth interpretivist case studies el(plored the key issues and 
framework in greater detail. Thre-e SMEs fi'om technical industries in regional 
Geelong, Australia, were stu:' ,Sf,::ven semi-structured o'~e hour interviews were 
conducted with a total of : (:vcn participants in 2006. Interview questions \\'ere 
drawn from literature and pc:ticipants were also asked about each element of the 
conceptual framework. Case study findings were used to further refine the 
framework. 
To validate this frameyvork, a final validation focus group vvith four particlpants was 
conducted. Three participants were from technically-oriented SMEs in the Geelong 
region and one was a nati01.B' expert in IT security. The fo·::us group v81 ict[;Jed each 
element of the frame\vork ard suggested several fin::;) enhancement:; res·,'Jting in a 
final version of the framevyork. de:·;(:ri·~)eci next. A tr2 nscript analysis also revealed 
other important findings, som: of v,bich wiil be reported later in this panel'. 
4. Conceptual Framewnrk for Fostering Inf.Olrm ation Security 
Culture for SMEs 
Figure 1 provides an issue·,b::sd cOllceptual framewcrk for developing lrJormation 
security culture in SMEs in n national context :krivej from lhe study. The 
framework is divided into ~;" .";::; gl'cup::: of deme:11~;: Ol'g~Jlis;j:iolWL [)(lcrnal and 
Outputs. It is 0vc:viewed bel ,I (wd, dUf:CO paper s;~~,; c('n~; rain!s, will be discussed 
in more detail in future pubIi';; lOns. 
4.1 OrganisrtHonaJ EJemef't" 
Leadership/Corporate Governance: Corporate governance is concerned with 
managing the business operation of an organisation and administering the optimal 
utilisation of its resources, it' security governance is a subset of corporate 
. -
governance and can be extenuec' to address the issues and imolicatiol1s to business of 
security responsibilities. 
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Organisational Culture: Organisations already nave their own values and cultures 
established. By working together, the interaction of these values and cultures can 
promote effective information security in orgamsations. 
Managerial: There are many managerial activities and initiatives that might attempt 
to develop information security culture in SMEs. 
~ 1\.isk Analysis/Asset Loss Protection: An assd loss protection process 
pruvides an approach to risk cmalysis that may motivate SME owners to 
i::;CLlS on inf,')rmation security rr:anagemem and issues. 
~ Budget: A budget is needed for information security, especially in SMEs 
where resourcing may easily be overlooked. This will enable cultural 
initiatives such as training to be resourced. 
~ Policies and Procedures: information security policies and procedures are 
required to direct required and acceptable employee information security 
cchaviour. 
S FLesponse: Procedures to respond quickly and :;.atisfactorily to new 
information security i3sues (for example breaches) as they arise 
'"vill also be beneficial in stressing the importance of 
information security to employees. 
~ Self Assessment: Every element of the management program should be 
regularly self-assessed seeking continuous improvement. 
~ Employment Contract/Handbook. During the induction of new employees it 
is important to use an employment contract or company handbook outlining 
what management regards as important information security information, 
policies and procedures and place restrictions and/or offer incentives. 
~ Management: As managers are responsible for information security and are 
role models for employees, they must model excellent information security 
behaviour. 
~ Assessment: Periodic assessment of each managerial element allows for 
continuous improvement. 
Individual and Organisational Learning: For smaller organisations, a process of 
organisational learning from individual to an organisational level is needed. In SMEs 
there is likely to be a variation in, e-Iearning, training and education needs for 
individual employees. 
Organisational Security Awareness: Informal awareness activities such as brown bag 
lunches are needed Marketing of these activities is needed. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual fral11':'ivork for fostering inf.l~rmat1.()n security 'i:uiture in 
~'.vn,<;§ in ttl national context. 
4.2 External Influences and h!iti3tives 
National and Ethical Culture: Different nations mav have their O\\'C values and 
cultures which will impact tile development of culture and must be considered by 
government and IT vendors, as summarised below. 
Government Initiatives: In the .Australian context, tbe national govtmment (federal 
and state) can provide benchn'arking. tax break incentives it)r impiemenlmg security 
procedures and technologies,.! (lining and education progn,ms and implementation 
information, among other inil::liiv(s. 
IT vendors have an important role to play to raise informaticn security aWc'l"eness for 
SMEs. 
4.3 Outputs 
Behavioural Issues: Extern? 1 lnd in.t~rnaJ measuref:,hould develop the 'Jr;>havioural 
traits (in employees) needed c.')' an ~ffertive intorm21iOl' security culture. These traits 
are identified below. 
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Re.sponsihi!zIJ rerers to employees needmg to llnder-:fc1f\d rules and responsibilities. 
Integrily F~l~rs to an ennloyee feeling 1)3rt of the com nany and thus identifying with 
its norms and morals arid handling iniormation with due integrity. Employees and 
management must trust one another. Finally, employees should behave ethically. 
Employee motivation, orientation and personal grOlL,I,? Slre also important to consider 
when de\elupj,1g organisational culture. Such behav~oural issues will influence the 
effectiveness of information security culture in SMEs. When employees are 
motivated, alig(lcd 10 ih~~ organisation's oL~ectives, c,r,6learning and improving their 
skills ancl k,-loVvlcdge, the information secu~ity culture \vi11 be strengthened. 
ReviewlE; 'CI/lwle,' SiVlE s shuu Id pl~r:odicaJy rcvic\'" their information security 
measures in order to use lessons learned to continuGllsly improve the information 
security cultuJ'e. 
5. Discussion 
This section summarises information security 1t the three case organisations (a 
greater description is not possible due to paper size constraints), followed by a 
discussion of a range of issues that arose throughout the project. As this is qualitative 
interpreti '1St research, the \'0 Ices of participants are l)t'ovided to better highlight the 
Issues. 
5.1 Case Study Analysis: Information Security Culture at Organisations A, B 
and C 
Organisation A is a small company specialising in engineering consulting with 
fifteen employees. Orgcmisation B is a small IT consultancy company with three 
employees. Organisation C is also a small IT consultancy with two employees. Thus, 
it would b~ expected that at least sorre of the employees would possess some 
technical skills and be able to Jollow information security practices. 
However, of the organisations interviewed, only organisation A had an information 
security rolicy cmd procedures in the organisation, although only a few of the 
employee:; were aware of the policy and knew ttat it should be implemented. 
Information security was not a priority in any of the organisations and very little 
effort was put into managing and implementing it effectively. Management in all of 
the organisations was of the opinion that information security was not a priority. 
However there was still a high expectation from employees regarding information 
security behaviour. Both employees and management were uncertain whether the 
level of security in the organisation was adequate, and believed that information 
security was not yet enculturated in their firms. 
The broader findings from the overall project involving two focus groups and three 
case studies are now examined 
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5.2 Information Security A\;~rene§s, Budget and Risk analysh in Australian 
SMEs 
According to focus group (1 and 2) partICIpants, information security risks for 
Australian SMEs have increasr;d as a result of greater intemd access hovvever the 
level of information security awareness in Sf\1Es has not kept apace and rernains low. 
A lack of awareness is a contributing factor to many Australian SME owners not 
having recognised the existence of an information security problem in their 
organisation, and thus their unwillingness to allocate a budget to this area. For 
example, one case study parti::ipant noted: 
Employees and management don't have an awareness of security Issues and the 
consequences of such issues. [:';1\1E owner, Organisation B] 
According to focus group participants, very few Australian SMEs allocate a budget 
to information security. This was thought to be because SME owners must first 
clearly see the risks involved before they would acknowledge the need for a budget 
(and time) for information security . 
.. , [budget is] probably the b\gf;st ~)b'StacJe. rIt is] hc,rcJ t'J f~:et sIDdler companies to 
set a budget for information security. [SME owner, Organisation A] 
In order for SlvjE owners to acknowledge the risks. focus gr'O'JP participants argued 
that a risk anaiysis was essv~ti81. However, convincing SMF owners 10 conduct a 
risk analysis currently presen-,:-; a challenge. According to IT consultants in the initial 
exploratory focus group (fo ~us group 1), clients do not trust IT vendors and 
consultants and do not wishio pay for a risk analys]s which they feel is aimed at 
selling them IT security products. Organisations Band C expressed the view that 
their companies were too :-,mall to conduct a risk analysis. Participants in the 
validation focus group (fOCLS E)rouP 2) suggested (Dat -lht l~ustralian gmrernment 
provide sample security risL ~;C'enarjos derived from sources sl;ch as the SANS 
Institute in the US. Such sceu(:os v";)uld emphasise Rsse1 loss protection in order to 
attract the interest of SMEs. As one participant conceptualised it: 
So federal government does t-lci,' thing - you know, handing CHlt terr.pwtes ,. and then 
you have the state governmem ... roll it out to businesses who are U1Jst! cl)mmencing 
(starting up). [SME Owner, Focus Group 2] 
Further to the issue of awaj·n',~ss. n was noted in cne of ihe f~')Cu", grovps that as 
SMEs general1y do not have ',:,J IT department they do not have internal knowledge 
of security issues and risks, cniJi(e large organisations with dedicated in-house staff 
and budgets allocated to IT security. it was thought w fo110\v on that SME owners 
would have the belief that inbnnation security is only a sigl<ficant (~(mCern for large 
businesses. 
Three case study participants ~d~') ~mgges!ed that another chaJenge toot:lr1g security 
conscious in S\,1Es was bec2 . .'se management was preoccupied wit" the running of 
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day-to-da;' ousines~; opc:ations and was only reacti i;t; concerning security matters. 
For example, in one cas
'
; organisation it Vv'ClS rerne;rke:i -l~1at: 
It is very hard to raise awareness as OWilers are gf-llerally too busy with other 
business i~;sucs to \\lony about security. [SME O'v\TleL OJganisation B] 
It was also ~uggest~,j b) locus group purticipan,') that _~T vendors can playa key role 
in raising securit;l awareness within Sj\!lEs. HOvVe\T' it was noted that before they 
can prm jde iniormatiJn security information, i:bc:y must (somehow) prove 
themselves trustworthy as SMEs can feel they art? being marketed IT security 
technologies. In the past.. IT vendors had issued nurnerous security warnings of 
viruses and otht"f risks tj~,at n~\'er evemu::.ted. As one pexticipant recalled: 
... there was a iot of hoo··ha (fuss) about the '{~ar 2000 bug and, you know, we all 
sat down expecting our Y'{hole computer society to C[('csh - and it didn't! [SME owner, 
Focus grulp 1J 
5.3 Beha,iotJ.rat Issue§ 
Commenting on the behavioural issues, participants in the focus groups and case 
studies supported the need for such behavioural traits Ll employees. They believed it 
would be v\':ry ciifficult ~o change a person's sei1se of r~sponsibility, trust, ethicality 
and personal growth and that it is almost impossible to change a person's sense of 
integrity, \'alues, orientation and motivation. For exar:;J~le: 
I see thc,1 as a core v,:ilue thC:L comes from CiLiJdhoxl. Ethics, values. trust and 
integrity .- the/rc all core values thai arc very, VL. difficult to change. Almost 
impossible! [SIVIE owner, Focus group 1] 
It was also noted that workers often refuse to be held responsible for information 
security breaches and 1 hat personal behaviour is not easily changed by a policy 
document It "vas suggested that it was better to hire the "right" person than to 
attempt to shape a worker into the "right" person. 
5.4 Management Initi2dves 
Participants agreed that appropriate management initiatives can help shape employee 
information security behaviour. They suggested that policies and procedures should 
be marketed to employees with the timing and manner of such marketing deemed 
important. Many participants felt that policies were generally too long and often not 
easy to understand. Thu:::, employees find it difficult 10 follow them. 
Don't make policies very long. Make them well structtved and easy to read. 
[SME owner, Organisation A] 
It was also noted that SMEs do not understand the concept ofbencl1marking and why 
it would oe considered important. They l1ave no krl<J\vledge in how to benchmark 
against other organisations. They felt that this was an area in which the national 
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government should assist SIv;:Es by providing more inform('tion on hO\\' to go about 
benchmarking and the benefit., 0,' such action. 
[benchmarking] is a good ide, however it will be difficult Ic. do as 3\1E5 don't know 
who or what they should be comparing against [SME owner. Organisation B] 
Focus group participants also "uggested that information security awart'neS3 could be 
integrated with the employee lllJucrion process so that employees undf~'rstand, from 
the very beginning, the imponanct of inl~jrmation seem it}' to the crganisation. 
However, it \vas pointed out by sorne that SM,Es are cHen :;110rma;ly organised and 
so may lack a formal induc::m prJcess. Focus group pa~licipants noted that this 
could be remedied by inclvding the security induction \vithin the employment 
contract/company handbook, Participants also mentioned the iL1portance of 
explaining the business ramifications of information securir.y breaches to (~mployees 
- for example, by mentiomng the potential disclosure of corpor3te strategic 
information. Showing the emr]oyees "What's in it for meT '",\ such meaningful ways 
would help "sell'" the policy, 
After employment, a build U) TO presenting policies could encourage employees to 
attend and become involvea. i~Fh\n l1ar:: lut1cnes were :mc:.Jf:;rcd as ;Ji~ c"XmnDle of an 
"-' ~),_ .l 
informal enjoyable environm'.ll in wilich j() present and discuss security policies. 
5.5 Individual and Organh;~:i(llJl::lJ Lfarninf; 
Participants noted that because of their size. there is generall:,r good communication 
in SMEs whicp eliminates tlx ;1~~eCl. [;-)r exrensive trai;ri,-.g .::1.;1,) educa<j'm. 
You don't need 3. lot of edu,~81;on hndlrainlng in (1~mal1 business. Be,:allse it's a 
very closed environment therc·s 8. lot of communication .. and once pcopi:: know what 
they're meant to be doing the .. )i con
'
:inue to do it and r;':~pec_::d!y if they ~,ee everyone 
else doing it. 
[SME owner, Organisation B. 
It would be difficult for s:rv;~: '.1Wfl.::rs >:0 r.',~asure whethf~r employees are gammg 
much knowledge from any f;~"ln of' learning if they are teft \.1 do it in th~:ir own time 
or if they ,,,,,ere to implenklt a learning program. They were unaware of any 
available programs for small organisations . 
.. . at the moment. if Iwant:C to CClJcb.c1 training t wculdlak;; up iY);, oivn course 
because I'm not aware of an:·! i:O\ln:~s it)' ep1pioyees e;,:;;ept tor largl: organisations. 
[SME owner, Organisation B" 
The question of whether SMI: olvners would permit employees the time to engage in 
e-learning and online comrnunlties 'Nas raised by focus group particlpant:;: 
Perhaps the smaller places \\.),ldn 't be able to afford the lilre for their employees to 
be able to become involved ':~:nat':' /\;1d I ',,,onder if the:-mployees would take the 
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time on their o\vn clock to become part of those sorts of experiences and those sorts 
of comm"mitics? 
[SME OWllfL Focus grot'p 1] 
It was also 'ne(:lionecl that so."ee types of employees iJlay not be interested in such 
activities: 
Some pe'Jple go to w('rk so they can SbO'N to at 8:',:,7l O1 and leave at 4:35pm, and 
earn their W:':ig;.c:', And JlOse rcople perhaps ;;),}'/ 1'1'. take as much out of it [e-
learning] as somebody who' s really interested in lJthering their career. [SME 
owner, FOCLls group 1 J 
It was suggested that learning may be better accepted by employees if ofTered by an 
indepencien[ neutral bu~,iness body such as a regio:l:::: Chamber of Commerce, or 
academia. rather than ,,In IT pmfessional firm: 
If it's a governing body or a body that's respected \y;rhin the context of a society, 
where there' s a means of interacdng and b:~nclmlarkll\, oecause you meet many peer 
businesses. theil thaCs :;000 {or encdl::U1at in{J al t1L: )wnerlmanager level. [SME 
owner, Focus group 1J 
5.6 Australian Governmental and Cultural Context 
It was noted in the Australian SMEs interviewed th'Jt they often have a relaxed, 
unconcemd approach to security issues. Participants also criticised the lack of 
government initiatives in helping SMEs v:ith security risks and issues. Suggestions 
were made by participqnts for a government (eitl~ f j Federal or State) marketing 
campaign raising secmty awareness; a brachvf':; !JFiI includes a variety of case 
studies that would spark interest among SMEs; 1clllplates for risk analysis; and 
information security standards for SMEs. 
In addition, it \yas agreed that difTerent countries exhibit unique values and cultures. 
Accordint=, ~(j r11any partlcipants, the Australian culnT,~ can be characterised by the 
catchcry "She'11 be right, mate!" and. as such, is a barrier to information security 
culture dcveloplnent in Australian SMEs. 
Well, you look [.t m'ttiunal culLure ar:.d what tc C;'tUlge, well, Wl1en it comes to 
computer seciJrity, the oid Auss~\; saying of "3h~ l1 bc , '5ht, mate!" [characterises the 
culture]. 
[SME owner, Focus group 1] 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has provided a theoretical perspective on information security culture and 
has presented an issue-based socio-cultural fran- r;work for developing and 
maintaining information security culture in Australic:x! SMEs (figure 1). The paper 
also provided key findirlgs from three interpretive C(l~ ': studies of Australian SMEs 
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and two focus groups that explored the framework in the Australian context. Key 
issues hindering the development of an information securi~y culture in Australian 
SMEs were highlighted by the case study and focus group findings. 
The framework has highlighted that internally, SME O\vners have the greatest 
responsibility and role in eF:.,uring a more security consc~ous organisation. They 
should perform an information asset protection process (that is, risk analysis) that 
helps them to identify the need for a range of measures including policies and 
procedures (supported by enabling technologies). However the effectiveness of these 
measures relies on an organisational security awareness program of informal 
activities to increase the awareness of SME employees. Awareness, training and 
education form the backbone of organisational initiatives to influence employee 
security behaviour. 
Australian SMEs should also be given greacer external support for developing an 
information security culture ty federal and state governments. Many initJatives were 
proposed in this study, including a national SME information security awareness 
campaign, benchmarking of information security culture in Australian SMEs, a 
brochure, tax incentives, formal traming and education programs. and opportunities 
for business collaboration. 
In conclusion, this research l~:~~s highlighted the criticality of s proactive SlVIE owner 
role and the need to consider the national context in order to institutionalise 
information security culture in S'AEs in a national setting. 
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